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Summary 
 
The pricing of interest rates on retail deposits in Croatia does not follow standard term 
structure or quantity premium for pricing deposits. Banks often pay no premium on time 
or on quantity of deposits. On one hand this is not surprising since the banking sector 
has been very liquid for last several years and the banks see deposits as a cost, but 
what is interesting is that the banks do not price in forward looking expectation regarding 
the state of economy or country rating. This paper uses a simple Black – Sholes model 
and incorporates forward looking expectations regarding the state of the economy into 
the existing deposit pricing structure for largest banks in Croatia1.      
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Using a textbook definition the banks get their funding from two main sources: primary 
sources of funding and secondary sources of funding. The simplest definition found in 
Gregurek and Vidaković (2013) is that the primary sources of funding are funds which 
bank did not actively collect, while the secondary sources of funding are funds which 
were actively obtained by the bank. In a banking centric country like Croatia most 
banking deposits come from retail. Retail deposits were 62% of total deposits and 44% 
of total aggregate bank’s balance sheet at the end of 2013. What is curious about the 
Croatian banking industry right now is that the banks pay little attention to the existing 
economic conditions in Croatia when pricing deposits. This paper tries to create a 
scenario of what would be the retail deposit interest rates of we include premium for 
country risk and adjust the premium for time.     
Last five years have been particularly difficult for Croatia. To fully understand the depth 
of the economic crisis we can look at the two main economic indicators: GDP and 
unemployment. Over the course of last 20 quarters (I 2009 – IV 2013) Croatia has had 
real GDP decrease in 18 quarters and last 9 were negative. The unemployment figures 
are also a clear indicator of the economic depression Croatia is in. The unemployment 
at the end of 2008 was 13,7% and at the end of 2013 it was 21,6% increase of 8,9%. At 
the same time period the number of employed has also decrease significantly from 
1.518.973 to 1.320.887. These numbers put the cost of recession at 200.000 jobs lost.  
Through this time period the banking sector has been remarkably robust. During the 
crisis, five largest banks in Croatia have never had negative net profits. Although the 
profits have declined and have oscillated over the recession years, the banking sector in 
general and 5 largest banks in particular (which are cca 75% of the whole market) have 
always been profitable. However the end of 2013 brought a different picture. Total 
profitability for the banking sector decreased by 70% from 2012 (gross profits were 3,3 
bln hrk at the end of 2012 and 1 bln hrk at the end of 2013) and for the first time one of 
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the top 5 banks had a loss. The decrease is even more drastic if we look at the good old 
days, in 2008 when total gross profits were 5,7 bln hrk. From the perspective of even 
rudimentary economic data of GDP decrease and increase in unemployment the 
decrease in bank’s profitability was to be expected.  
The outlook for 2014 is also negative. S&P rating agency expects another 1% GDP 
decrease and this does not include any major budget spending decreases which might 
cause even larger GDP decrease. So the banks cannot expect any improvement in the 
economy and the probability of worsening credit portfolio is highly likely. Poor 
expectations of the economic are also manifested in the credit rating which is junk, BB+ 
with negative outlook from Fitch.  
However through this time period there have been two facts which the central bank 
governors and politicians have always pointed out: the banking system in Croatia is 
highly liquid and highly capitalized2. The first fact can be verified with the fact that for five 
years M0 is greater than M1. The second fact can be verified from the data, at the end 
of 2013 the banking sector capital adequacy has been 20,88%3. However no one has 
addressed the fact that if the banks decide to pay out dividends from retained earning, 
such payout would immediately significantly decrease both capital adequacy and bank’s 
liquidity.  
From the perspective of crisis and stability Croatia was one of the countries which did 
not have a significant problems with the banking sector when the crisis hit in 2009. As 
mentioned even today, five years into crisis Croatian banks are highly liquid and stable, 
unlike some other countries like Cyprus.   
When the financial crisis hit Cyprus the banks had large problems. One of the ways, an 
exceptionally extreme ways to deal with the situation was to convert uninsured deposits 
into capital4.  
This measure was a precedent in the client bank relationship. In case of Cyprus bank’s 
clients, who entrusted the bank with their money had more than one possible result on 
                                                 
2
 There are numerour occurances where this was ounted out by the current and previous CNB governors, for 
examples look at www.hnb.hr 
3
 The data is available from CNB publications or on its website www.hnb.hr 
4
 For more on what was done in Cyprus look at the European Commission Communication regarding Cyprus and 
European stabilization mechanism FAQ.  
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their investment: they could be turned from borrowers into shareholders.  This brought a 
standard client-bank relationship into a whole other perspective.  
From the above summary it is clear the situation in banking sector in Croatia is not 
optimistic. At this time the banking sector is highly liquid and highly capitalized however 
because of the bad loans both liquidity and capital can be affected. What is interesting 
thought this crisis the banks in Croatia have done nothing to preserve and maintain 
liquidity from primary sources of funding. As a matter of fact the deposit rates have 
decreased from 2008. Most banks we are going to analyses in this paper pay very little 
for time or quantity premium on their deposits, time premium or country risk.  
The retail deposit structure in Croatia does not distinguish for the possibility of extreme 
events, as a matter of fact when we look at the data from Table 1 we can see most 
banks do not separate the interest rates based on term structure or quantity. Interest 
rates are often the same regardless of the time or quantity deposited. 
Banks have different size classes and often have no size premium or time premium. For 
example Bank 4 and 5 have one set of interest rates for any kuna deposit. Bank 2 has 
no time premium for deposits over 2 years.  
From the data it is clear the banks do not include any premium on extreme events like 
the country default or forward looking expectations regarding the state of the economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Table 1: Retail deposit interest rates for 5 largest banks in Croatia 
 
Source: Bank’s websites 
 
HRK 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 49999,99 1,55 2,1 2,45 2,85 2,95 3,25
50000 - 199999,99 1,6 2,15 2,55 2,95 3,1 3,35
200000 and more 1,65 2,25 2,6 3,05 3,15 3,45
EUR 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 4999,99 0,75 1,25 1,7 2,05 2,15 2,2
50000 - 24999,99 0,95 1,4 1,8 2,2 2,35 2,6
25000 and more 1,05 1,55 1,9 2,35 2,5 2,7
KUNA 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 2500,99 1,9 2,4 2,8 3,2 3,3 3,3
2501 - 5000,99 1,9 2,4 2,8 3,2 3,3 3,3
5001 - 10000,99 1,9 2,4 2,8 3,2 3,3 3,3
10001 - 25000,99 2 2,5 2,9 3,3 3,5 3,5
25001 - 49999,99 2 2,5 2,9 3,3 3,5 3,5
over 50000 2 2,5 2,9 3,3 3,5 3,5
EUR 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 2500,99 0,9 1,6 1,9 2,3 2,5 2,5
2501 - 5000,99 0,9 1,6 1,9 2,35 2,55 2,55
5001 - 10000,99 1,05 1,75 2,01 2,4 2,6 2,6
10001 - 25000,99 1,05 1,75 2,1 2,45 2,65 2,65
25001 - 49999,99 1,1 1,8 2,2 2,5 2,7 2,7
over 50000 1,2 1,9 2,3 2,6 2,8 2,8
HRK 1 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 36 - 60 months
from 9999,99 1,60 1,70 2,00 2,05 2,10 2,15
10000 - 49999 1,85 1,95 2,05 2,15 2,20 2,25
over 50000 1,95 2,05 2,15 2,25 2,30 3,35
EUR 1 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 36 months
from 2499 0,40 0,50 0,65 0,90 1,05 1,20
2500 DO 9999 0,75 0,85 1,00 1,25 1,40 1,55
over 10000 1,00 1,10 1,25 1,50 1,65 1,80
HRK 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months
from 2000 1,8 2,4 2,9 3,25
EUR 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months over 24 months
1000 - 2500 0,8 1,65 1,85 2,3 2,4
2500 - 5000 0,8 1,65 1,85 2,3 2,5
5000 - 10000 1 1,65 1,95 2,35 2,5
10000 - 25000 1,1 1,8 2 2,4 2,6
25000 - 50000 1,1 1,8 2,05 2,5 2,7
over 50000 1,1 1,8 2,1 2,5 2,7
HRK 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months 24 months
all amounts 2,00 2,50 3,00 3,30 3,60
EUR 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months 24 months
do 9999,99 1,15 1,85 2,15 2,50 2,75
10000 - 24999,99 1,20 1,90 2,20 2,55 2,80
25000 - 49999 1,25 1,95 2,25 2,60 2,90
over 50000 1,30 2,00 2,30 2,65 3,00
BANK 1
BANK 2
BANK 3
BANK 4
BANK 5
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This paper tries to augment the existing interest rate structure of Croatian banks for the 
time premium and probability of government default. At the basic tool we use Black -  
Sholes formula with forward looking rational expectations agents. The theoretical 
explanation for the Black – Sholes formula is given in the next chapter.  
 
 
2. Rational for the options model 
 
 
One of main postulates of the rational expectations theory states the economic 
participants will make the optimal decision given the available information5. Before we 
move into the model, let us look at what is the “available information” in our case. 
 
 The banking industry in Croatia is stable, liquid and highly capitalized, but at the 
end of 2013 it became clear the banks are next in line to take the brunt of the 
crisis. 
 Highly liquid and highly capitalized industry can easily become highly 
undercapitalized and non-liquid if there is a large payout of the dividends to 
mother companies which in case of five largest banks in Croatia are all foreign 
companies.  
 Mother companies themselves might not be as strong and capitalized as they 
once were. The best examples are Hypo bank and Unicredito6.   
 In case of Cyprus the politicians have ordered a debt for equity swap in order to 
increase the capital of the banks. This might have been better for the owners of 
the deposits since the straight out liquidation of the banks would decrease the 
chance of repayments of large deposits.  
 Croatian economy is in an economic depression and the outlook for the economic 
is not improving, at least for the 2014.  
                                                 
5
 This does not imply the economic participants have full information, only that given their information they will 
make the optimal choice.  
6
 Uncredit reported a EUR 15 bln loss in 2013.  
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 The case of Cyprus has another important implication; it has let the Ginny out of 
the bottle and has opened a possibility for every country in the EU to exercise the 
same option in case the banks need more capital. Now a deposit is no longer, 
just a deposit, but there is also a possibility for the deposit to be converted into 
bank’s equity.  
 
The above information presents part of the information for a rational economic agent 
who has decided to place a large deposit with the bank. However it is all the information 
we need for the analysis in this paper.  
If the bank has a possibility to convert a portion of deposits into equity, this from the 
perspective of financial derivatives implies the banks have a possibility to “purchase 
equity” so in essence we are dealing with a call option: right to buy. If the bank has the 
possibility to exercise the right, then by the nature of position taking in trading it has a 
long position in call option. On the other hand the depositor has a short position in call 
option. Depositors should request premium for this possibility to be included in the 
pricing of deposits. Also deposits should be forward looking and include possible 
problems with the economy.  
 
 
3. The Black Sholes formula  
 
 
Standard model for pricing options is the Black-Scholes formula for options pricing 
based on models presented in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Excellent 
derivation and explanation of the Black Sholes formula can be found in Hull (2006). The 
mathematical representation of the formula is:   
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Where each of the symbols has the following notation C is the price of a call option, S is 
the current price of an asset, K is the strike price, e is base of natural logarithm, r is the 
risk free interest rate, t is time until the option expiration in years, N(d) is the normal 
probability distribution. Parameter σ is the volatility used which can be both historical 
and implied volatility, based on the approach to calculation.  
In our case we are going to use the following parameterization. The strike price will be 
equal to the current price, so the pricing will be done at the money. For the strike price 
and the current price we will use the interest rate on the deposits. The rates have been 
taken from the web sites of the five largest banks in Croatia. The time period will be the 
time period for the deposit depending on their time bucket. For the actual time the end of 
the bucket will be used. So a 3 – 6 months time bucket will be calculated as 6 months. 
Risk free interest rate will be the rate of government T-bills with equivalent maturity as 
the time of deposits. For volatility we are going to use implied volatility derived from the 
credit rating’s probability of default. The probability of default is taken from the S%P 
capital IQ report on sovereign rating and the probability of default was 22%7. This is a 
forward looking probability of default. Based on Fitch ratings the probability of default 
should be smaller, but since we are dealing with forward looking agents we have to look 
at the implied, not historical volatility.  
 
 
4. Deposit structure in Croatia 
 
 
From Table 1 it is clear the banks do not price in credit rating or forward expectations 
regarding the stability of the banking sector. Using the Black – Sholes formula and 
specified parameterization the new term structure of retail interest rates should be:   
 
                                                 
7 Data taken from the S&P capital IQ report. 
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Table 2: Adjusted retail deposit interest rates for 5 largest banks in Croatia 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
HRK 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 49999,99 1,59 2,19 2,60 3,11 3,34 3,80
50000 - 199999,99 1,64 2,24 2,71 3,22 3,51 3,91
200000 and more 1,69 2,35 2,76 3,33 3,57 4,03
EUR 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 4999,99 0,77 1,30 1,81 2,24 2,44 2,57
50000 - 24999,99 0,97 1,46 1,91 2,40 2,66 3,04
25000 and more 1,08 1,62 2,02 2,56 2,83 3,15
KUNA 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 2500,99 1,95 2,50 2,97 3,49 3,74 3,86
2501 - 5000,99 1,95 2,50 2,97 3,49 3,74 3,86
5001 - 10000,99 1,95 2,50 2,97 3,49 3,74 3,86
10001 - 25000,99 2,05 2,61 3,08 3,60 3,97 4,09
25001 - 49999,99 2,05 2,61 3,08 3,60 3,97 4,09
over 50000 2,05 2,61 3,08 3,60 3,97 4,09
EUR 1-3  months 3 - 6 months 6 - 12 months 12 - 24 months 24 - 26 months over 36 months
500 - 2500,99 0,92 1,67 2,02 2,51 2,83 2,92
2501 - 5000,99 0,92 1,67 2,02 2,56 2,89 2,98
5001 - 10000,99 1,08 1,82 2,13 2,62 2,95 3,04
10001 - 25000,99 1,08 1,82 2,23 2,67 3,00 3,10
25001 - 49999,99 1,13 1,88 2,34 2,73 3,06 3,15
over 50000 1,23 1,98 2,44 2,84 3,17 3,27
HRK 1 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 36 - 60 months
from 9999,99 1,64 1,77 2,12 2,24 2,38 2,51
10000 - 49999 1,89 2,03 2,18 2,34 2,49 2,63
over 50000 2,00 2,14 2,28 2,45 2,61 3,91
EUR 1 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 36 months
from 2499 0,41 0,52 0,69 0,98 1,19 1,40
2500 DO 9999 0,77 0,89 1,06 1,36 1,59 1,81
over 10000 1,02 1,15 1,33 1,64 1,87 2,10
HRK 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months
from 2000 1,84 2,50 3,08 3,54
EUR 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months over 24 months
1000 - 2500 0,82 1,72 1,96 2,51 2,72
2500 - 5000 0,82 1,72 1,96 2,51 2,83
5000 - 10000 1,02 1,72 2,07 2,56 2,83
10000 - 25000 1,13 1,88 2,12 2,62 2,95
25000 - 50000 1,13 1,88 2,18 2,73 3,06
over 50000 1,13 1,88 2,23 2,73 3,06
HRK 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months 24 months
all amounts 2,05 2,61 3,19 3,60 4,08
EUR 1 months over 3 months over 6 months 12 months 24 months
do 9999,99 1,18 1,93 2,28 2,73 3,12
10000 - 24999,99 1,23 1,98 2,34 2,78 3,17
25000 - 49999 1,28 2,03 2,39 2,84 3,29
over 50000 1,33 2,09 2,44 2,89 3,40
BANK 1
BANK 2
BANK 3
BANK 4
BANK 5
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This new term structure of interest rates includes the forward looking expectations 
regarding the state of the economy and the time premium for deposits. This increases 
the price of deposits, which is to be expected. Also using this model any further 
decrease in credit ratings also increases the implied volatility and further increases the 
interest rates.  
Incorporating the options premium the interest rates on retail deposits now have 
standard term structure. What this model also implies is that is the existing economic 
conditions in Croatia further deteriorate the probability of default (implied volatility) 
should also increase thus increasing the price of deposits.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The pricing of retail deposits in Croatia does not include any premium for the state of the 
economy or the probability of country default. This paper uses a simple Black – Scholes 
model in order to incorporate these two problems into pricing of retail deposits. Using 
the Black – Sholes formula the time premium and country risk premium was included in 
the existing deposit structure. This adjustment has increased the price of deposits.  
The model has used implied volatility so the increase in the price of deposits in the 
model also incorporated the expectations regarding the state of the economy. This gives 
the model a forward looking character, but it also indicates that any further deterioration 
in the economy and decrease in the country credit ration should also increase price of 
the retail deposits. In the future it will be interesting to see if decreasing economic 
conditions do lead to increase in the price of retail deposits.  
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